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1. The ‘international rule of law’, although still in the process of 
beingconceptualized, should incorporate elements of ‘(quasi-) 
judicial oversight’ 
– which refers to the process whereby courts review the decisions 
of‘political institutions’ against specific normative standards set 
out in the  
constitution, or in other normative instruments containing ‘higher 
law’.  
2. There is functional, institutional and procedural equivalence 
between theWorld Bank Inspection Panel and courts in non-
international constitutional  
systems exercising judicial oversight.  
3. Over time, courts exercising judicial oversight tend to increase 
the degreeof de facto judicial independence from political 
institutions, as well as thedegree of judicial influence and power 
(‘judicialization’); thereby realizingoutcomes such as resolution of 
constitutional disputes, human rightsprotection, and legitimization 
of political institutions.  
4. The World Bank Inspection Panel – while lacking formal decision- 
making authority and being institutionally dependent on the Bank’s 
Board  
of Executive Directors – asserts its de facto independence from 
Bankmanagement and staff, and expands its influence through 
mechanismssimilar to those used by courts exercising judicial 
oversight.  
 
5. Quasi-judicial oversight exercised in the World Bank Inspection 
Panel  
context exhibits similar limits to when judicial oversight is 
exercisedby courts; therefore, the Inspection Panel can only expand 
its degree ofjudicialization and de facto judicial independence to a 
certain extent beforetriggering backlash from limiting factors such 
as political pressure andjudicial mental models.  
6. Intricate discussions about abstract legal theory may drive many 
studentsto boredom or to the verges of despair (I. Brownlie, The Rule 
of Law in  
International Affairs – International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary 
of the  
United Nations, at 22 (1995)), but legal theory remains the 
conceptualblueprint through which practice-oriented lawyers might 
gain a betterunderstanding of how ‘law’ unfolds in public space.  
7. Hirschl rightly criticizes the practice of using intimate 
knowledge of aparticular constitutional system as the primary 
motivation for conducting“freestanding single country” comparative 
analysis (Hirschl, The Question  
of Case Selection in Comparative Law, 53 American Journal of 
Comparative  
Law 125, at 127 (2005)); however, it is a compelling reason for 
including  
such a constitutional system in a multi-country comparative analysis.  
8. International lawyers are often hesitant to acknowledge that they 
aretransposing ideas from the national to the international level for 
fear ofbeing accused of “mindless borrowing”.  
9. Lawyers frequently use the word ‘system’ (e.g., ‘legal system’  
or  
‘constitutional system’) without having an understanding of basic 
systemstheory; and without being aware of the potential benefits to 
be garnered forlegal analysis by employing system theory’s conceptual 
frameworks and  
analytical tools.  
10.Universities should make it compulsory for all doctoral candidates 
tofollow an introductory course in project management.  
11. Once a lawyer has been married to an engineer for more than fi ve 
years,  
it is inevitable that he or she will begin to describe legal concepts 
on aCartesian plane.  
 
